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This paper is a critical examination of Odera Oruka’s theory of punishment in his 
Punishment and Terrorism in Africa. It argues that although Oruka clearly highlights 
the weaknesses of the Retributionist and Utilitarian accounts of punishment and 
therefore calls for the Reformist view of ‘treating both the criminal and society’, he is 
mistaken in calling for the abolition of punishment simply because it cannot reform 
the criminal. The paper contends that the reform of the criminal is only one major 
function of punishment and not the only one, and so we cannot call for its abolition on 
the basis of this single consideration. The paper further urges that Oruka’s theory of 
punishment is rather deterministic: according to him, the criminal commits the crime 
because of the criminal forces which he or she has very little control over, so that he 
or she cannot be held morally responsible for his or her actions. 
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Introduction 
The issues of crime and punishment have been of great concern to human beings for a 
long time. This is probably because they touch on human dignity either directly or 
indirectly in that any time a crime is committed the victim’s rights are violated by the 
criminal, and any time punishment is administered the question of whether it is just 
arises (Sommer 1976). A lot has been written on the justification of punishment in 
general. But although punishment has been a crucial feature of every legal system, 
“widespread disagreement exists over the moral principles that can justify its 
imposition” (Greenawalt 1983,343). One fundamentally controversial question in the 
moral debate on punishment has been why (and whether) t  social institution of 
punishment is warranted. 
 
Odera Oruka argues in his book, Punishment and Terrorism in Africa (1985) that 
punishment is unwarranted and should be abolished because we cannot eliminate evil 
(crime) by evil (the inflicting of pain inherent inpunishment). Oruka advocates for the 
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‘treatment’ of the criminal and calls “for the aboliti n of punishment because it 
cannot reform criminals” (Oruka 1985, 78). 
 
This paper therefore seeks to assess the validity of Odera Oruka’s argument on the 
abolition of punishment. In this regard, it endeavours to address the following 
questions: 
• What are the main tenets of Oruka’s theory of punishment? 
• Can punishment reform the criminal? 
• How can we morally justify punishment? 
• Ought punishment to be abolished if it cannot reform c iminals? 
 
The paper is divided into six sections. The first section is the introduction. The second 
analyses the concept of punishment in general. In the third section, the paper presents 
Oruka’s theory of punishment, after which the fourth offers a critique of the theory. 
The fifth section addresses the question of whether or not punishment can indeed 
reform criminals - what Oruka refers to as ‘treatment’ of the criminal - and if not, 
whether or not it ought to be abolished. This is followed by the concluding remarks in 
the sixth and final section. 
 
 
The Concept of Punishment 
The concept of Punishment is not the exclusive province of the law. From time 
immemorial parents, communities and societies have us d punishment as a 
mechanism for social behavioral control. From a Judeo-Christian perspective, we are 
told that the Supreme Being punished the first man and woman for disobeying His 
command. We can therefore identify some common featur s that are inherent in 
actions that are regarded as punishment.  
 
Greenawalt (1983, 343-344) argues that for punishment to take place, the following 
features must be present: “established authority, breach of conventional standards, act 
of condemnation, inflicting unpleasant consequences and responsible agents”. For 
Greenawalt (1983), in typical cases of punishment, persons who possess authority 
impose designedly unpleasant consequences upon, and express their condemnation of, 
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other persons who are capable of choice and who have breached established standards 
of behavior. Punishment is therefore a practice that is performed by, and directed at, 
agents who are responsible for their actions in some sense. To punish, one must 
consciously inflict harm on the wrong doer as a just dessert for his or her action 
(retribution). What is more, to serve its deterrent function, punishment must involve 
designedly harmful consequences that most people would wish to avoid. 
 
Boonin (2008) argues that actions that constitute punishment in the criminal justice 
system have five necessary elements: 
(1) They are authorized by the state. 
(2) They are  intentional and directed toward a particular end or action outcome. 
(3) They are  reprobative (express disapproval or censure). 
(4) They are retributive following a wrongful act committed by the offender. 
(5) They are harmful resulting  in suffering, are a burden, or result in deprivation to 
the offender (Boonin 2008; cited in Ward & Salmon 2009, 240). 
 
It can therefore be observed that punishment “serve th  goal of re-affirming the 
society’s collective agreement on what is wrong and what is right as well as re-
invigorating the individual conscience” (Sommer 1976, 174). 
 
Oruka’s Theory of Punishment  
Odera Oruka outlines his theory of punishment in his book, Punishment and 
Terrorism in Africa (1976, 1985). We will summarise what we believe to be the main 
tenets of Oruka’s theory of punishment. Oruka attempts to give the rationale “for the 
abolition of the practice of punishment” and not “the abolition of the concept of 
punishment” (Oruka 1985, p.xi). He sets out by observing that “there are two 
philosophical views on punishment that are strongly opposed to each other” (Oruka 
1985, 4).  On the one hand, we have the retributive view which holds that punishment 
is itself a reward, compensation or a kind of annulment of a crime. On the other, there 
is the utilitarian view which holds that punishment is in itself undesirable and ought 
never to be inflicted for its own sake or just because a crime has been committed. 
Punishment in the utilitarian view “should only be administered if it promises to 
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exclude some greater evil; if it has good consequences to both the criminal and 
society” (Oruka 1985,5). 
 
Oruka rejects both of these positions, and presents a  alternative - punishment for 
reform/ rehabilitation. He argues that both the retribu ivist and utilitarian arguments 
for punishment are flawed because “they overlook or ignore the criminal forces, 
which are primarily responsible for the commission of crimes and focus only on the 
criminal’s free will” (Oruka 1985, 14-15). For him, every person is born without 
knowledge of good and evil, so that his or her character is mostly the result of 
inherited character traits and social experiences. Oruka argues that people commit 
crimes because of the “desire to fulfill some economic or psychological needs” 
(Oruka 1985, 17). There are several “criminal forces or factors” that induce people to 
commit crimes. These are to be found in one’s social experience and the nature of 
one’s material or economic existence. These forces include “irresponsible parental 
care, belonging to a despised or poverty stricken class, bad education” etc. (Oruka 
1985, 18). 
 
Thus for Oruka, anyone who commits a crime is compelled to do so by these criminal 
forces that are beyond his or her control - he or she i  a victim. Consequently, we 
cannot hold the criminal morally responsible for his or her actions. Therefore 
although an individual may commit a crime intentionally, such individual is always 
only a victim of the criminal forces: “Acting intentionally is therefore not 
incompatible with non-responsibility” (Oruka 1985, 19). 
 
Since according to Oruka punishment in the retributivist and Utilitarian senses only 
focus on the ‘victim’ of the criminal forces- the criminal - they cannot be morally 
justified. He therefore calls for the abolition of punishment in favour of what he calls 
criminal and society ‘treatment’. By the treatment of he criminal, Oruka refers to the 
curative and non-punitive ways in which we may help a criminal to change his or her 
criminal manners and become a citizen without criminal tendencies or behavior. By 
‘Society treatment’ Oruka refers to the ways in which the social ills, bad conditions or 
obstacles to decent existence inherent in a society an be cured or removed (Oruka 
1985, 87). 
 
102 Jacinta Mwende Maweu 
 
According to Oruka, in so far as punishment cannot and does not concern itself with 
treating either the criminal or the society, it is ineffective because it cannot reform the 
criminal. Punishment only serves as a temporary restraint: as soon as the criminal 
forces become intense, the restraint ceases to hold and the criminal is once more 
forced to act criminally (Oruka 1985,88). Oruka argues that unlike punishment, 
treatment aims at eliminating the basic cause of crime: the main emphasis is on 
eliminating the criminal forces. Criminals should therefore receive ‘individualized 
treatment’ to help them rise above the criminal forces. But individual criminal 
treatment can only be effective if it is coordinated with ‘society treatment’: individual 
treatment is only of secondary importance to society treatment, which is of primary 
importance (Oruka 1985, 89). 
 
Reformists such as Oruka therefore advocate for ‘treatment’ of the offender and not 
punishment per se, holding that punishment is better described in deterr nt and 
retributionist terms. For example, like Oruka, Sommer (1976) argues that criminals 
are victims of social, economic, political and psychological forces in our society. 
According to Sommer, since society is responsible for the presence of these deviants, 
it is society’s moral responsibility to make amends and help them to adjust to these 
criminogenic forces. 
 
Oruka further makes a distinction between the pain experienced in punishment and 
that experienced in treatment. Punishment is to its recipient intrinsically painful and 
hence intrinsically evil. Treatment on the other hand can only be painful or unpleasant 
extrinsically, as a means to an end: the pain experienced in the course of treatment is 
necessary for curing the victim. Therefore while punishment aims at inflicting pain or 
harm as an end in itself, treatment aims at inflicting pain to rid the criminal of his or 
her criminal behavior (Oruka 1985, 91). Oruka therefore concludes that since no type 
or amount of punishment can obliterate any criminal force and consequently no 
criminal can ever be truly reformed or cured by punishment, punishment ought to be 
abolished. In similar fashion, Duff & Garland (1994) observe that as an objective of 
punishment, reform/treatment of the criminal embraces the strengthening of the 
offender’s disposition and capacity to keep within the law, which is intentionally 
A Critical Assessment of  Odera  Oruka’s  Theory  of Punishment 103 
 
  
brought about by the human effort to change rather t an through the fear of 
punishment. 
 
Critique of Oruka’s argument 
Although Oruka’s critique of the retributivist and utilitarian views of punishment has 
merit - that both philosophical views overlook the criminal forces and focus only on 
punishment fitting the crime committed -, his argument for ‘treatment’ or the 
rehabilitation of the criminal is equally wanting. His call for the non-punitive 
treatment of both the society and criminal runs into both practical and conceptual 
difficulties. The philosophy of punishment for reform, what Oruka calls treatment, has 
its basis in the positive school of criminology, which was founded by Cesare 
Lombroso (1835-1909). The positive school rejected the classical doctrine of free 
will, which had emphasized on the “punishment fitting the crime” propagated by 
Cesare Beccaria (1963) and Jeremy Bentham (1970). Positivists argued that 
punishment should fit the criminal and not the crime. The positive school therefore 
focused on the individual criminal rather than on the crime, believing that the only 
sure way to curb crime is by effecting the necessary changes to the social environment 
that influences the criminal (Bilz &Darley 2004). 
  
The main conceptual challenge to the advocacy for the treatment of the criminal lies 
in the distinction Oruka attempts to make between the nature of pain involved in 
treatment and that entailed in punishment (Oruka 1985, 25-26). Whereas it is easy to 
assert that the pain inflicted in the retributivist sense of punishment is itself evil 
because it is an end in itself (pain for pain’s sake), it is rather difficult to assert the 
same with regard to the utilitarian perspective. Pain in the utilitarian sense of 
punishment is supposed to eliminate a greater evil of the crime committed for the 
benefit of the society (Ellis 2003). However, the main challenge in using the 
utilitarian view of punishment still remains - how to determine the appropriate amount 
of punishment that is likely to eliminate the greater evil. 
 
Likewise in Oruka’s Treatment theory the challenge lies in how to determine, prior to 
administering ‘treatment’, the ‘right cure’ for a particular criminal or different 
criminals who have committed a similar crime due to different criminal forces. Even 
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if that were possible, where will the criminals be as we try to identify their 
individualized appropriate cures? Will they not be held involuntarily in some location 
as the authorities try to identify the criminal forces that compelled them to commit the 
crime? Does this ‘withholding’ not amount to punishment- the loss of liberty? If pain 
is in itself evil, a view that Oruka seems to agree with, does it become any less evil if 
the intentions of inflicting pain are noble - to treat the criminal? 
 
On the practical front, the main challenge to implementing Oruka’s treatment program 
would be that Judges lack the time to get sufficiently acquainted with an offender's 
history to make such individuated sentences (Shafer-Landau 1991, 211). It may be 
objected that difficulties in practically implementing principles of sentencing do not 
undermine the principles themselves. Yet if the principles cannot be implemented 
they ought to be abandoned. Further, individualized punishments or treatments would 
naturally amount to an indeterminate sentencing policy: the criminal would be on 
treatment indeterminately until he or she is fully cured of the criminal forces. 
However, the question that arises from the notions of the intensity and duration of this 
indeterminate treatment has to do with the ability to predict correctly - the question is 
whether or not human behaviour is predictable. The debatable assumption in the 
philosophy of reform or treatment is that we can predict with certainty when the 
offenders have been reformed enough to be released from the treatment program. 
 
But following the high degree of our inaccuracy in prediction especially of human 
behaviour, it is probable that we will make grave mistakes in an attempt to establish 
whether or not a particular criminal has been reformed. For instance, we have had 
cases where the criminal ‘fakes his reformed behaviour’ to ‘deceive’ the officials that 
he or she is ready to go back to the society, only for him or her to commit a crime on 
his or her way home and to be arrested again. In such cases, whom do we hold 
accountable - the officer for false prediction or the criminal for faking reform? Using 
Oruka’s criterion, what would be the criminal force ompelling the criminal to ‘fake 
cure’, and what treatment ought to be administered next to ‘fully’ cure him or her? 
 
Oruka’s theory of punishment is also highly determinist c: according to it, the 
criminal commits the crime because of the criminal forces which he has very little 
control over, and therefore cannot be held morally responsible for his or her actions 
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(Oruka 1985,17- 18, 88). It can therefore be faulted for neglecting the agency of the 
criminal and treating him/her as a mere victim of circumstances. If Oruka’s argument 
about the actions of the criminal being overly determined by the criminal forces is to 
be taken seriously, it is defeatist. We can only morally ‘treat’ or punish individuals if 
they are in some sense responsible for their actions. Consequently, Oruka  cannot 
authoritatively argue for the treatment of the indivi ual criminal, but only that of the 
society since the society is primarily responsible for the commission of the crimes. 
Oruka’s argument can therefore be said to go against the fundamental principles on 
which we base our moral judgment: the principle of freedom and agency of the actor 
(Greenawalt 1983). 
 
Can Punishment or even Treatment reform Criminals, and if not, 
ought it be abolished? 
Since punishment involves pain or deprivation that people wish to avoid, its 
intentional imposition by the state or any other established authority requires 
justification (Greenawalt 1983, 346). The central question remains, just as Oruka had 
posed it, whether or not society needs to retain a system of behavioral control that 
involves the infliction of pain. Generally the moral theories on the justification of 
punishment have been categorized as either Forward- looking and outcome oriented 
or backward looking and dessert- oriented (Bilz & Darley 2004, 1217). Backward 
looking theories (Retributive theories) are the oldest theories on the justification of 
punishment, and focus on what happened in the past (crime) unlike the forward 
looking theories (Consequentialist theories), which focus on the future - the effects of 
punishment both on the individual and on the society (Ward & Salmon 2009). Some 
of the oldest proponents of the retributivist view of punishment were Immanuel Kant 
(1887) and G.W.F.Hegel. Kant argued that society not only has a right to punish a 
person who deserves punishment, but also has a duty to do so. Hegel on his part held 
that punishment honors the criminal as a rational being and gives him what is his right 
to have (Hegel cited in Greenawalt 1983, 347). 
 
Consequentialist theories of punishment hold that tere is a contingent relationship 
between the overall goal of crime reduction and the practice of punishment. For them, 
punishment functions to deter, incapacitate or reform ffenders, and these effects in 
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turn reduce the overall crime rate (Orth 2003). Consequential theorists therefore 
morally justify punishment on the grounds that more than any other types of crime 
reduction practices it is likely to produce an overall effect of crime reduction. They 
therefore view punishment as the most effective wayof reducing crime rate (Ward & 
Salmon 2009, 241). Thus according to the consequentialist view, reform of the 
criminal is not the sole purpose of punishment, much as it is one of its key objectives. 
The moral justification of punishment on consequentialis  terms can therefore be 
summarized as “prevention/deterrence; to maximize social security” (Oruka 1985, 
27). 
 
Oruka asserts that we reform a criminal not just to make him or her a decent citizen, 
but most importantly so that others may be free from the evils that his or her crime 
may inflict on them (Oruka 1985, 27). One is then lft to wonder if Oruka does not 
contradict himself when he acknowledges that the main aim of punishment is not just 
to reform the criminal but to maximize society’s security, and then he turns around to 
call for the abolition of punishment since it cannot reform criminals. In fact, Oruka 
points out that whether punishment is justified on the basis of just retribution, 
reformation, deterrence or compensation, the end result is social security (Oruka 
1985, 26-29). What Oruka does not clarify in his call for the abolition of the 
institution of punishment is: if punishment cannot indeed reform criminals, does it 
mean it has failed in its overall function of maximizing social security? If punishment 
still maximizes social security through deterrence, just retribution, incapacitation or 
compensation, on what grounds does he call for the abolition of the whole institution 
due to its failure to reform the criminal? 
 
In our view, it is paradoxical to talk about treatment or punishment for reform. 
Reform or rehabilitation of the offender is about discretion because it deals with 
personality facets of the criminals, which by their very nature are oblique and 
therefore not easily subjected to objective assessmnt. When proponents of reform/ 
rehabilitation such as Oruka call for the understanding of the individual offender, his 
or her background and character so that we can treat him or her of his or her criminal 
forces, they do not provide us with an objective criterion with which to determine if 
the criminal has been reformed. Whether we call it treatment or punishment, 
reforming the criminal in this sense would be a dynamic process involving the careful 
A Critical Assessment of  Odera  Oruka’s  Theory  of Punishment 107 
 
  
and continuous assessment of our objectives and of the alternative consequences of a 
given judgment at any particular point. How then would we morally justify a 
particular form of ‘treatment’ which was expected to be curative but turned out to be 
ineffective? 
 
What is more, reform or treatment of the offender is a complicated process that can 
only be undertaken by persons with the requisite expertise. The time the criminal 
takes to be ‘cured’ and thereby to be fit to go back to the society can only be 
determined by an expert - a psychologist, counselor, psychiatrist, group therapist, or 
whoever else is closely studying the criminal in order to understand why he or she 
engages in crime. Taking into account the number of people who commit crimes 
every day and the available experts, it is not practic lly possible for any society to 
reform or treat criminals per se. 
 
Nevertheless, punishment ought and can be geared towards the reform of the criminal, 
its other functions notwithstanding. Our view is that we cannot call for the abolition 
of punishment on the basis that it does not reform c i inals. ‘Treatment’ which is 
responsible for the reform of the criminal ought to entail some sanctions such as 
temporary loss of liberty. In this way we will obviate the criticism against the 
retributivist view of punishment for the sake of punishment and the charge against the 
utilitarian view of using the offender as a mere means to an end. Punishment in an 
attempt to treat the offender will also bridge the gap between offender- oriented and 
offence-oriented approaches to crime. As Moberly (1968) observes, if any form of 
punishment is to reform, it must be such that it enables the offender “to see his 
offence as does the society by which or in whom it is inflicted” (Moberly 1968, 140). 
We therefore punish the criminal for the offence committed partly in an effort to treat 
him or her of the criminal forces. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has outlined the main tenets of Oruka’s theory of punishment, provided a 
critical analysis of the theory, and attempted to illustrate the conceptual and practical 
difficulties of adopting his ‘Treatment’ account. The paper has also outlined the main 
functions of punishment in general and argued that since the reform of the offender is 
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just one major function of punishment besides deterr nce, incapacitation, 
compensation and retribution, Oruka is mistaken to call for the abolition of the whole 
institution of punishment simply because punishment ca not reform the offender. We 
conclude by calling not for abolition of punishment, but for punishment in an attempt 
to treat the offender. 
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